China and the World at a Crossroads

A note on a dialogue held at the Oxford Martin School

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Key Takeaways

The most important takeaway is not whether China's green transition is a global public good or a source of friction, but how the world engages with a transformation that is now structural and irreversible. The sense of the meeting can be distilled as follows:

- **China's green transformation is structurally irreversible** and will reshape global markets whether the world engages constructively or not.
- **The binary framing**—global public good versus systemic friction—is too simple. China's transition is both at once, depending on the domain and the vantage point.
- **The world is not a unified actor** and must be engaged through differentiated strategies: what works for the European Union will not work for Brazil, and what matters to South Africa differs fundamentally from what matters to Germany.
- **The China–EU axis** is the most structurally promising vehicle for a cooperative global green transition—the dialogue's central wager—but it depends on both sides confronting deep mistrust and addressing legitimate security and economic concerns directly.
- **Security is the dominant organizing concept** in most governments today. Reframing the green transition as a security strategy—energy, food, resource, and supply chain security—is essential to political traction.
- **China faces a decisive choice:** to move from the posture of "a developing economy with limited responsibility" to that of "a great power with positive commitments," particularly on debt restructuring, technology transfer, and multilateral leadership.
- **De-escalating the prevailing adversarial narrative**—in media, politics, and academic discourse—is a precondition for progress on every other front. It is a responsibility of political leaders and commentators on all sides of the debate.
- **We are not designing a new system from scratch** but working with a "collection of arrangements," some still functional and worth reinforcing rather than abandoning.

Recommendations

These takeaways point toward the following directions for action—illustrative rather than exhaustive:

1. **Narrative.** All parties, including the European Union and the United States, commit to de-escalation and a shared program of confidence-building measures.
2. **Security framing.** Recast the transition as a collective-security strategy (energy, food, resource, supply chain), engaging security and dual-use concerns directly.
3. **Equity model.** Shift from export dominance toward equity investment, joint ventures, and local value added (e.g., EV manufacturing and green steel in Brazil).
4. **Truth infrastructure.** China leads the funding of shared monitoring, early-warning systems, and data transparency as global public goods.
5. **China–EU backbone.** Open with harmonized green-finance taxonomies, labelling standards, and product-level carbon accounting.
6. **Differentiated arrangements.** Build problem-specific bilateral, regional, and thematic arrangements; reinforce those still functional.
7. **Expand CCICED.** Replicate the model with Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, and the Gulf, and commission a dialogue on the just transition.
8. **Finance.** Launch a debt-for-green-performance coalition and align public development banks through Finance in Common.
9. **Status pivot.** Support China's framing of itself as an ecological great power, with the obligations that standing entails.
10. **Quiet convening.** Prioritize low-profile, quick-win cooperation to build a "momentum of success."

The underlying choice is between strategic competition and strategic cooperation—and it will decide whether the green transition spreads or stalls.

Introduction

The China and the World at a Crossroads dialogue gathered approximately 20 senior experts from across academia, policy, diplomacy, and civil society, representing Europe, the United States, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, China, and international institutions. The meeting was convened to explore a central question: **can China's green transformation become a genuine global public good, or will it intensify systemic friction and geopolitical rivalry?**

While the CCICED[1] community is rich in high-level expertise on environment and development, the dialogue deliberately sought to widen the circle, targeting experts with a deep knowledge of China and its place in the world but who approach the topic from a wide variety of cultural, geographical, and professional perspectives. The dialogue supplemented the careful work of the CCICED High-Level Task Force (HLTF) and provided a reality check on the more familiar perspectives as seen through the environment and development lenses.

The dialogue was structured across four sessions, moving progressively from context, through diagnosis of risks and opportunities in the green transition, to strategy and priorities for China in addressing present challenges. It was intended to generate thinking that could feed into the CCICED HLTF and, through it, the ongoing debate on China's role in the world and into its broader policy processes.

This Note

This note is not intended as a report on the dialogue, nor as a summary of the debates. Instead, it is aimed at drawing out some highlights that address the central question, structuring these in a way that will facilitate their consideration by the HLTF in finalizing its report and recommendations.

The note was prepared by the organizers of the dialogue and may or may not represent the collective views of the participants or those of any one of them. Instead, it seeks to distil the insights from a very rich debate in ways that enhance its relevance to the work of CCICED and its HLTF. The note aims to offer a sense of the meeting to those interested in the topic.

The dialogue was held under the Chatham House rule.

Sense of the Meeting

The most important takeaway from the dialogue is not whether China's green transition represents a global public good or a source of friction. China's green transformation is now a structural feature of the global economy—irreversible and certain to reshape global markets whether the world engages constructively or not.

[1] The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development. The China and the World at a Crossroads dialogue arose in the context of CCICED's work, and in particular that of its High-Level Task Force.

The central policy challenge is therefore not whether the world engages, but how engagement can maximize shared benefits while managing legitimate economic, security, and geopolitical concerns.

The following points capture the sense of the meeting; the sections that follow substantiate them.

- **The binary framing is too simple.** Global public good versus systemic friction is a false choice: China's transition is both at once, depending on the domain and the vantage point.
- **The world is not a unified actor.** It must be engaged through differentiated strategies; what works for the European Union will not work for Brazil, and what matters to South Africa differs fundamentally from what matters to Germany.
- **The China–EU axis is the most structurally promising vehicle** for a cooperative global green transition—the dialogue's central wager—but it depends on both sides confronting deep mistrust and addressing legitimate security and economic concerns directly.
- **Security is the dominant organizing concept** in most governments today. Reframing the green transition as a security strategy—energy, food, resource, and supply chain security—is essential to political traction.
- **China faces a decisive choice of posture:** to move from a developing economy with limited responsibility to a great power with positive commitments, particularly on debt restructuring, technology transfer, and multilateral leadership.
- **De-escalating the prevailing adversarial narrative**—in media, politics, and academic discourse—is a precondition for progress on every other front, and a responsibility of leaders and commentators on all sides.
- **We are not designing a new system from scratch.** The task is to work with a "collection of arrangements," some still functional and worth reinforcing rather than abandoning.

The Context

We are living through a period of exceptional disruption. In the words of Antonio Gramsci, "the old is dying and the new is not yet born." Further, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney underlined at the World Economic Forum earlier this year, there is no going back to the world that characterized the past decades of relative stability. Whatever new order emerges, it will be the result of the decisions (or failures to decide) made now and in the coming period. This is both a risk and an opportunity; the challenge is to manage the risk while seizing the opportunity. For the moment, we are navigating in a deep fog of uncertainty. Whereas we may be seeking to move to a new, established order, it is possible also that the coming period may be one of permacrisis in which no new stability emerges or does not for a period of time.

We are seeking to address four parallel tectonic shifts:

- The scale and urgency of planetary issues (climate change, biodiversity loss,

pollution, social exclusion, etc.) and their increasingly immediate impact on society, economy, and security.

- The crisis of the international system of rules and institutions on which international cooperation has depended.
- A crisis of democracy in the West, and particularly its governance failure in dealing with systemic threat. In the extreme case, we instead see (particularly in the United States) a last-gasp defence of an old system—a collapsing supernova.
- The AI revolution and both the risks and opportunities it presents.

China is central to all four of these shifts, and there can be no doubt that China will play a central role in designing the new world order. The pace and scale of China's development contribute to the impact of these tectonic shifts, if only in creating the need to address the unintended consequences of its rapid rise to a position of global dominance.

Whether the world order that emerges strengthens the global green transition—or intensifies geopolitical rivalry—will depend on shifting the focus from one that concentrates on risk and threat, to one that draws out an alternative pathway, to greater stability, global resilience, and a new configuration for global cooperation based on a clear and rapid transition to a sustainable planet.

Certainly, China's domestic green transition has been impressive. Internationally, China's image is mixed. Compared to other partners, China is regarded as better organized, and offers greater policy consistency, greater reliability, and technology that is much in demand. Partners in the Global South hope to move toward more balanced economic relationships as China shifts more deliberately toward higher-quality development, leaving poorer economies to fill the spaces they vacate. China's development model—based on lifting all, a consistent industrial policy over time, and investment in key sectors and capacities—is increasingly attractive to China's partner countries, especially when compared to power-based alternatives.

At the same time, **China is still regarded in many places as a threat, a condition exacerbated by the speed and scale of its penetration into international markets and its increasingly competitive positioning at the higher end of technological innovation and production**. How it plays this new hand is a matter of considerable importance, and one that is intensely debated. There are scenarios under which China undermines both developed and developing markets by its dominance and pursues a power-based strategy focused on a narrow vision of its national interests. There are other scenarios in which the expansion of China's penetration into global markets lifts the poorer economies and forges partnerships with the more advanced ones. Which path is chosen will determine the future of the planet. We are genuinely at a critical fork in the road.

What is needed now is not a nostalgic yearning for a relatively stable and familiar past, but to reset the terms of engagement, to pursue approaches that drive alignment rather than fragmentation and that focus on taking full advantage of opportunities while managing risks to this effect. We must move—on the basis of a shared diagnosis—from a position of strategic competition to one of strategic cooperation, lowering the tensions inevitably involved in a global transition.

The dialogue did not avoid the first-order tensions that shadow these scenarios, and this note records them without endorsing any particular reading. They include industrial overcapacity and subsidy competition; the scope and conditionality of technology transfer; debt sustainability and the terms of development finance; asymmetries in market access and the treatment of foreign firms; the dual-use and supply chain dependencies that a rapid transition creates on all sides; and the use of tariffs, export controls, and unilateral measures such as carbon border adjustment. These concerns run in more than one direction and implicate all the major economies, not China alone. Whether they are treated as problems to be managed jointly or as pretexts for fragmentation will do much to determine which scenario prevails. Naming them plainly is itself a precondition for the confidence building the dialogue called for.

Key Takeaways

A handful of conclusions cut across the dialogue and recur throughout the analysis that follows. China's transition is at once a global public good and a source of friction, and the central task is to maximize the first while managing the second. Progress on almost every front depends on de-escalating the prevailing adversarial narrative and on reframing the green transition as a matter of collective security. And no single template will serve: the world is best engaged through differentiated, problem-specific arrangements rather than a single new system designed from scratch. The sections below develop these themes across three strategic domains; the recommendations that close the note translate them into proposed action.

Strategic Opportunities

Three primary domains emerged as both being of fundamental importance to the success of the global green transition and as being ripe for resolute and positive action.

China–EU Partnership for the Green Transition

One strong opportunity emerged from the dialogue: the potential of a China–EU axis for the promotion of the green transition. Both are formally dedicated to its advancement and, were they able to align their efforts and extend them to their international economic relations, this would represent a strong force for sustainable development and help to counter countries and regions still pursuing policies that undermine the future health of the planet. China and the European Union might emerge as **ecological great powers**, though this would require an acknowledgement from China that it is no longer in any true sense a "developing" country, just as Europe must accelerate its transition away from carbon-based fuels. **The two could assume a shared responsibility to create a viable and just global model.**

This otherwise attractive opportunity is at present rendered difficult owing to the fraught relations between the two and the deep structural distrust that today

characterizes these relations. The European Union—still adjusting to a world where the United States is no longer a reliable strategic partner—still regards China principally as an economic and security threat. A series of confidence-building measures would be needed, especially addressing first-order concerns about China's competitive position and trade tensions relating, for example, to unilateral policy-making like CBAM.

Positive early priorities could include harmonizing green finance taxonomies, labelling standards, and product-level carbon accounting: trust building with immediate commercial relevance.

What might emerge is a China–EU mutual security development alliance that addresses the existential risks inherent in the present development model. This would have to address continuing "ungreen" aspects of China's green transition; if China has successfully solved the production side of the green transition, the consumption side remains unaddressed.

China and the European Union might begin overcoming mutual hostility through pursuing a series of cooperative approaches that appear possible today under the heading of the green transition as a crisis-avoidance mechanism:

- Cooperation where competition is not a key factor—the deployment of soft power in areas where China and Europe's visions align.
- Cooperation between China and the European Union that diverts competition; for example, large-scale R&D investment, university cooperation, or the creation of a China–EU approach to the applications of AI to development.
- The confluence of competition and cooperation; for example, through joint ventures, joint value chains in the green transition arena, cooperation on common standards, mechanisms for mutual recognition, etc.
- Joint initiatives on the redesign of institutions for international cooperation.

For all the challenges facing such a cooperative axis, it nevertheless offers a genuine potential to create a central backbone for the green transition globally. The size of the prize is enormous.

Trade

Both the shift from rivalry to cooperation, and a new notion of collective security, will require **rethinking and identifying positive approaches to international trade and finance**. The breakdown of the multilateral, rules-based trading system has left a bitter aftertaste of inequity in the Global South, while trade dominance based on economic strength has become increasingly common. Trade has become a point of contention among trading partners, undermining security and cooperation. The dominance of financial and capital markets by the Global North has contributed to a sense that the international financial system is stacked against emerging countries. China has managed–in respect of the developing countries–to place itself in the middle, wearing neither a world-dominant mantle associated with the United States or the G7, nor a mantle that places it in full solidarity with the emerging economies and the Global South.

China will need to emerge from this ambiguous posture and craft a new strategic

position, with the strong influence it has as a lead trading power (and thus akin to most OECD countries) but with the development solidarity of a long-term member of the "G77 and China." **How it forges this new position will have massive implications on the core question of this dialogue**. One fork in the road leads to a green transition that spreads rapidly and becomes the new norm. The other leads to a world of power-based dominance by those with the economic and military capacity to impose their will. The latter would, to all intents and purposes, condemn the green transition to failure.

The next economy will most likely rise from discontinuities; for example, a global food and nutrition crisis. A recrafted trading system must therefore be set within a framing of global security and serve as a central mechanism to reinforce that security. But it will also need a new panoply of tools, standards, and rulebooks for trade cooperation that serves the public good and not simply the mercantilist interests of powerful trading countries.

CCICED should establish a working group on reform of the multilateral trading system with a mandate to identify actions that would accelerate the green transition without creating new trade inequities.

Finance

What is true of trade is true to an even greater degree for finance. The "financialization" of financial and capital markets–the gradual move away from finance primarily serving the public good to serving the interests of finance itself–has meant that finance is no longer principally at the service of development.

The crippling debt load of much of the Global South is an example of both the risks to the global economy and the opportunity for creative action to address these risks. Collective action on debt overhang offers a means to strengthen the green transition. Linking debt relief to the achievement of agreed performance indicators in the environment and development fields, in particular, is a promising ground for new cooperation on directing capital to measures that consolidate the green transition.

Securing the finance needed for the green transition without exacerbating the burden of debt on poor countries is a challenge that will require strong leadership and global agreement to implement new solutions. It could be a target for a purpose-built coalition of the sort described above and would benefit greatly from bold Chinese leadership.

A fresh look at the adequacy and role of our international financial institutions is also needed. For example, what is the role of central banks in a world of high volatility and insecurity? And given the clear need to enable developing countries to secure financial autonomy and investment capacity, should not the reform of the aid system focus on large cooperative ventures that create capacity in these countries, including the building of local capital markets? The emerging role of public development banks in the new development finance system–to a large extent replacing ODA and even the role of multilateral development banks–is worth exploring, in particular through their Finance in Common platform and summits. Aligning the over 500 PDBs and their USD 23 trillion in assets could provide a strong base for funding the green transition.

A CCICED working group might, over the course of the coming year, seek to draw up an agenda of the most promising finance-based initiatives and reforms that would speed up and consolidate the global green transition. This should include a detailed mapping of initiatives and innovations in finance that, if broadly implemented, could increase chances of success, as well as a mapping of current international processes working in this direction.

An Emerging Agenda

In addition to the three strategic action areas set out above, some ideas for further thought, dialogue and action began to crystallize throughout the 2 days. The following section returns to a selection of the key takeaways with a view to formulating recommendations for further cooperation and articulating some of the principal obstacles that will have to be overcome.

Narrative Shift

The dominant international narrative relating to China's impact on the planet combines admiration for its domestic economic and technological success and a sense of threat at what China's rapid growth could mean for other parts of the world. Of late, this narrative has grown more adversarial, focusing on the threat that China poses and how that threat might best be parried. This narrative mirrors the growing and increasingly structural polarization that characterizes politics in Western democracies and reinforces a sense of strategic competition and urgency. As such it overplays China's coercive role and underplays the sources of its legitimacy.

If we are to advance the more cooperative options, it is essential on both sides to **"de-escalate"** this narrative, drain it of adversarial language, and begin a shift to one that emphasizes the full range of positive opportunities for all sides linked to the green transition. This must identify and highlight ways in which the present distrust of China's position and intentions might be overcome by positive action and confidence-building measures. It will need to emphasize the ways in which accelerating the green transition can be a win-win prospect for both China and its partners. A focus on the increasing importance of building toward ever-greater resilience as a central requirement of human security and planetary stability must remain at the centre of the new narrative.

The new narrative must usher in a period of re-engagement, focusing on those things that drive alignment and reverse fragmentation while recognizing that all transitions can be a source of friction.

A great deal is understood on the mechanism for bringing about a narrative shift. A CCICED study group might usefully gather best practice and plot out a way forward toward the co-creation of the vital narrative underpinning of the global green transition.

Collective Security

The notion of security is increasingly central to countries; the opportunities opened by the green transition must lie at the heart of a narrative that is aimed at reinforcing

security. It is therefore critical to **reframe the green transition as a strategy to address collective security concerns**. The traditional military notion of "mutually assured destruction" might usefully be flipped to one that seeks a state of mutually assured development. Likewise, we must work toward a new development-based definition of security, as exemplified by the clean energy transition. The green transition might thus be seen as a development model for developing countries and a foundation for a new concept of shared security.

Achieving this security is no longer a matter for states alone, or even perhaps principally for states. The most important contributions may emerge from non-state actors, shared crises, and transboundary systems. The new security framework may well oscillate between state-level codification and more diffuse, multi-actor cooperation.

China may well be approaching a shift from export-dominated engagement to one based on equity investment and joint ventures, as Japan did at the equivalent level of development. Should this be accompanied by genuine technology transfer and value-added manufacturing, it could reinforce the new notion of collective security; for example, EV manufacturing in Brazil, or green iron and steel using Brazil's abundant iron ore and renewable energy.

One way or the other, security must be at the centre of the narrative, and the genuine security concerns must be squarely addressed, or they will end up being an obstacle to the green transition. A discussion paper might usefully be commissioned by CCICED that articulates ways in which a security-centred narrative might be developed as a joint initiative between China and international partners.

Innovation

With a consensus around the conclusion that we have left the familiar world behind and now need to create something new, the importance of **making innovation central** to all action emerges strongly. China's present competitive advantage, for example, owes much more to its strong innovation ecosystem and policy than it does to the availability of cheap labour and subsidies.

Innovation requires a strong foundation in genuine science and data. With this foundation under attack in some parts of the world, an early important priority might be to invest in the "truth infrastructure"–shared scientific monitoring, early-warning systems, data transparency, individual and institutional capacity, etc.–as global public goods. This is a priority on which China might take a lead; to do so would be a strong positive point in raising China's standing as a reliable international partner. Also critical is international cooperation in addressing regulatory lag in areas key to the innovation ecosystem, such as around AI.

A sharp focus on creating an innovation-friendly environment is fundamental to beating back the nostalgia for the past and contributes to a focus on opportunity rather than on risk or threat. If the fruits of that innovation are shared, it helps lay the foundation for more mutually beneficial and less adversarial forms of cooperation among countries and regions.

Affinity Networks–Alignment vs fragmentation

If the international, rules-based order is broken and we are uncertain what will replace it, the emergence of a highly diverse and experimental set of institutional mechanisms is a high probability. A single dominant approach based on global intergovernmental organization undervalues the importance of differentiated approaches and the range of actors able and willing to contribute to the search for solutions. In pursuing global action on the green transition, **China will need to pursue different strategies** for dealing with different countries and regions (e.g., India, Brazil, or the Gulf).

What may emerge is a collection of "arrangements"–bilateral, regional, topic-related, tailor-made for a particular problem, etc.–that offer a more diverse and flexible formalization of relationships and that can be adapted with greater ease. Also possible in the volatile world of today is cooperation driven by crises–agreements that address and defuse a particular crisis rather than setting a pattern for the longer term. A scaling up of such bespoke arrangements could constitute an emerging mosaic that gradually and effectively replaces the established global agreements and institutions that constituted the era now ending.

What is certain is that these must be focused on the mutual pursuit of a shared goal (the green transition) and move beyond the zero-sum game that has characterized too much of international negotiations in the past period.

CCICED might usefully commission a concept paper on the notion of a diverse foundation of arrangements increasingly underpinning our international cooperative system, and an initial mapping of such arrangements that already exist.

Multiply Platforms for Dialogue–Bridge dialogues where they don't meet

The emergence of a new international order will require considerable interaction and cooperation. It will require exploration of new opportunities and the building of mutual understanding. Shoring up the central functions of the multilateral system in high-priority areas of environment and development will remain key, and there is widespread hope China will play a leading role, as it did with the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.

Adaptation of existing platforms to serve as a basis for the green transition is also important. China is thinking through the greening of the Belt and Road Initiative, but other forums could play a similar role; for example, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), an unusually structured and effective bilateral engagement forum. These models might be reproduced in other regions.

CCICED itself has proved to be a very productive platform for dialogue between China and its international partners. The model might be expanded and employed for some of China's key partners and competitors; for example, a CCICED that engages the expert communities of Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, or the Gulf region in a bilateral or regionally focused forum. CCICED might also be encouraged to engage more directly with some of the more intractable issues relating to the green transition; for example, by sponsoring an international dialogue on social aspects and the just transition.

Exchanges should be encouraged at every level. A deliberate focus on "next generation" education should be explored as a long-term trust-building mechanism;

for example, joint research and student exchanges, especially between China and the Global South. Specialized centres that explore China's approach to eco-civilization might be established in international universities with a view to understanding the concept and its adaptability to other parts of the world.

The new era will likely see the weakening of purely governmental or intergovernmental institutions. One of the most promising ways to explore and develop a higher range of approaches, innovation, and experimentation is to allow civil society to flourish. Exchanges among non-governmental organizations should be encouraged and afforded space to flourish. China's well-known wariness in respect of civil society is at present an obstacle to this. And yet it is an important element in spreading the green transition model around the world.

Finally, emphasis might be placed on areas of cooperation susceptible to producing positive results in a short time, building a "momentum of success" and addressing immediate problems with direct action and results. In this respect, China might take a greater interest in ecological restoration, regenerative agriculture, rewilding, and the wider notion of a bioeconomy, and build cooperation around these.

In the early period, the focus should be on "quiet convening": low-profile initiatives that offer and demonstrate an alternative to present behaviour by the United States and its imitators, the gathering of "coalitions of the willing" around shared priorities.

Final Thoughts

Between here and now and our green transition goals there are many pathways. We must ask ourselves how central is China to each of these? If China's role should prove to be determinant, we must identify positive approaches that address the real dilemmas through a search for opportunity and mutual benefit. We must build a narrative that introduces a new concept of global development and responsibility around cooperation in the green transition, leading to a new and development-centred concept of how lasting security may be achieved.

This will take a resolute decision to lower tensions and look for common ground. China can play a leading role in designing and setting the operating system for a new economy based on the implementation of the principles of an ecological civilization at a global scale. This offers hope for the green transition genuinely becoming a global public good and a cooperative process set in motion to defuse the systemic friction and geopolitical rivalry that currently impede that goal being reached.

Recommendations

The dialogue pointed toward a set of directions for further thinking and action. The following are illustrative rather than exhaustive, but they reflect the dialogue's central concerns:

- **Narrative.** All parties—including the European Union and the United States—commit to de-escalation and a shared program of confidence-building measures.

- **Security framing.** Reframe the green transition as a collective-security strategy—energy, food, resource, and supply-chain—engaging security and dual-use concerns directly rather than around them.
- **Equity model.** Shift from export dominance toward equity investment, joint ventures, and local value added, beginning with flagship projects such as EV manufacturing and green steel in Brazil.
- **Truth infrastructure.** China leads the funding of shared monitoring, early-warning systems, and data transparency as global public goods.
- **China–EU backbone.** Pursue a China–EU green axis, opening with harmonized green-finance taxonomies, labelling standards, and product-level carbon accounting.
- **Differentiated arrangements.** Build problem-specific bilateral, regional, and thematic arrangements, and reinforce those still functional.
- **Expand CCICED.** Replicate the CCICED model with Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, and the Gulf, and commission a dialogue on the just transition.
- **Finance.** Launch a debt-for-green-performance coalition and align public development banks through Finance in Common.
- **Status pivot.** Support China's framing of itself as an ecological great power, with the obligations that standing entails.
- **Quiet convening.** Prioritize low-profile, quick-win cooperation to build a "momentum of success."

Circulation Notice

This note was prepared to share outcomes of the China and the World at a Crossroads dialogue, held on April 27–28, 2026, under Chatham House Rule, among experts engaged in the CCICED High-Level Task Force initiative. It does not represent the institutional views of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Oxford Martin School, or any other participating organization. Recipients are kindly asked to treat the contents as discussion material intended for the HLTF expert community and to please reach out to IISD before you share the note more widely.