Impressive Progress in China’s 1+N Policy Framework

President Xi stated in his speech at the opening segment of COP15 in Kunming in October last year that China would “put in place a ‘1+N’ policy framework for carbon peaking and carbon neutrality”. Since then, a series of climate-related policy documents have been issued, some containing many explicit quantitative targets. The speed at which these policies have been developed is very impressive.

However, it has been a bit tricky to untangle exactly how this ‘1+N’ framework fits together, and often it hasn’t been immediately clear whether new documents are part of the framework or not. This has been difficult even for climate policy observers in China.

In this article we attempt to clarify the framework, and provide an update of the key documents and targets which have been issued so far. • An overview table of numerical targets has been prepared under the EU – China Environment Project (a project funded by the EU), of which a summary has been provided at the bottom of the article.

The 1+N framework

The idea of a ‘1+N’ climate policy framework was first disclosed a year ago, in a March 2021 meeting of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), followed by a formal announcement by the NDRC in a briefing conference to the media home and abroad.

After President Xi confirmed the imminent introduction of the ‘1+N’ framework in his speech at Kunming COP 15 in October, two documents were released, marking its formal launch. They are the Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy (“Overarching Guidance”) issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, and the Action Plan for Carbon Peaking Before 2030 issued by the State Council (“2030 Peaking Plan”). According to an interview with an NDRC official, the Overarching Guidance is the ‘1’, while ‘N’ are various policies, starting with 2030 Peaking Plan.

Carbon peaking plans for various fields and industries, as well as local carbon peaking plans, are also a part of the broader framework. In July 2021, China’s special climate envoy Xie Zhenhua delivered a speech in which he took a broad view on the scope, which was confirmed in an NDRC interview. Relevant authorities will design sectoral plans based on the 2030 Peaking Plan, and localities shall form their own carbon peaking plans accordingly.

According to NDRC, the ‘N’ policies will include implementation plans for carbon peaking in the fields of energy, industry, transportation, urban and rural construction and others, as well as supporting measures on science and technology, carbon sinks, statistical accounting, inspection and assessment, and safeguard policies on fiscal, financing, and pricing methods.

Mr. Xie Zhenhua in his speech divided the framework into 10 key areas, including on:

• energy structure,
• industrial transition,
• energy saving and low carbon buildings,
• green and low carbon transportation,
• circular economy,
• technology innovation,
• green finance,
• supporting economic measures and reforms,
• carbon market and carbon pricing,
• nature-based solutions.

So, what counts as a ‘1+N’ policy exactly?

Mr. Xie’s classification provides a clear path for the ‘1+N’ framework to take shape. However, over the past few months, polices were issued in a somewhat scattered manner, with national level and localities issuing new documents almost every week, but without a clear statement on what counts as a ‘1+N’ policy. Few people could tell you what are the existing ones released so far. Does any carbon related policy automatically fall under the scope, such as all of the energy policies released last year? How do they relate to the sectoral 14^th five-year plans – are they part of the system as well? What is the role of NDRC in coordinating this process?

We believe that the policy-making power has been delegated to the NDRC, so that NDRC has the final say over what counts as a ‘1+N’ policy. In an Europe-China Partnership Dialogue event held in July 2021, NDRC said that it was formulating the top design together with relevant authorities, mandated by the high-level leadership group for carbon peak and carbon neutrality, and it will quickly prepare the implementation plans for different fields and industries. If so, then documents issued by other departments without the participation of the NDRC (or the State Council, as its higher authority, or the CPC Central Committee, as the leadership) can’t be a formal part of the national ‘1+N’ system. That would also be the case for provincial and city level action plans.

Following this standard, namely, NDRC, State Council or Central Committee as one of the issuing institutions, and mentioning the two guiding documents as its basis, we can identify a number of documents that would count as ‘1+N’, in addition to the two released last October:

1. The Notice on Leading Green and Low-carbon Actions by Public Institutions, State Organ Affairs Administration, NDRC, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Ecology and Environment;
2. The Implementation Plan on Promoting the Green and High-Quality Development of New Infrastructures such as Data Centers and 5G, NDRC and three other administrations;
3. Implementation Plan for Promoting Green Consumption, NDRC and six other administrations;
4. The Opinion on Green Energy and Low-Carbon Transformations, NDRC and the National Energy Administration.

What about other climate-related policies?

There are many other important policies which do not fulfill the above criteria but are closely related. Taking a broader scope, those may also count as part of the ‘1+N’ framework. But perhaps they were issued before the framework, there was no reference to the framework, or it’s unclear whether the leading authorities have played a role in approving the plans. For example:

1. The Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Establishment and Improvement of a Green, Low-Carbon and Circular Developing Economic System, State Council in February 2021;
2. The Opinions on Tightening Energy Efficiency Constraints and Promoting Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction in Key Areas, issued before the Overarching Guidance in October 2021, by NDRC and four administrations. This document contains appendices with detailed action plans for the metallurgy and construction industries, as well as the petrochemical and chemical industries. Although carbon peaking is mentioned, it is focused on preventing the blind development of high energy consuming and high emitting projects.
3. The Opinions on Promoting the Green Development of Urban and Rural Construction, jointly issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, which mention carbon peaking and neutrality multiple times as a goal. It was also issued before the Overarching Guidance.
4. The Guiding Opinions on Promoting the High-quality Development of Central Enterprises towards Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality, issued by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in November 2021.

Apart from those documents, various sector-specific 14^th five year plans were issued last year, including on industry, transportation, energy etc, not to mention provincial and city level plans. It is unclear whether those are part of the ‘1+N’ framework as well. Another issue is that amongst those documents, we observe that they contain fewer new targets, especially numerical ones.

Conclusion

It is very encouraging to see so much attention being devoted to developing carbon peaking plans in China. This process itself is certain to lead to an increased level of understanding around the climate transition.

However, it would be unfortunate if this proliferation of policy documents ends up being poorly implemented as a result of a lack of clarity, specificity, or confusion over the relation between them. To facilitate the implementation of these policies, it could be helpful if the Chinese government would issue some easily understood communications, perhaps including tools such as infographics. This would help stakeholders across China, including all sectors and geographies, get a much better grip on the whole ‘1+N’ framework and how it fits together, and allow all of them to play their role in advancing a smooth climate transition which ensures on energy, food and livelihoods.

The progress in the rollout of the 1+N framework to date is very impressive, and we expect many more ‘N’ documents to emerge in the months and years ahead.

The views expressed in this op-ed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of CCICED.

Appendix: Summary Table of China’s ‘1+N’ Climate Policy Framework, prepared by the EU – China Environment Project (a project funded by the EU)